McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem
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McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem
McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem

The McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem is a result in social choice theory. It states that if preferences are defined over a multidimensional policy space, then majority rule is in general unstable: there is no Condorcet winner. Furthermore, any point in the space can be reached from any other point by a sequence of majority votes.
The theorem can be thought of as showing thatArrow's impossibility theoremholds when preferences are restricted to beconcavein
. Themedian voter theoremshows that when preferences are restricted to be single-peaked on the real line, Arrow's theorem does not hold, and the median voter's ideal point is a Condorcet winner. The chaos theorem shows that this good news does not continue in multiple dimensions.
References
[1]
Citation Link//doi.org/10.1016%2F0022-0531%2876%2990040-5McKelvey, Richard D. (June 1976). "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control". Journal of Economic Theory. 12 (3): 472–482. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(76)90040-5.
Sep 28, 2019, 5:32 PM
[2]
Citation Link//doi.org/10.2307%2F2297259Schofield, N. (1 October 1978). "Instability of Simple Dynamic Games". The Review of Economic Studies. 45 (3): 575–594. doi:10.2307/2297259.
Sep 28, 2019, 5:32 PM
[5]
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Sep 28, 2019, 5:32 PM